


Ima
Emotivist



- “X is good” means “Hurrah for X!”
- Moral judgments aren’t true or false.
- We can’t reason about basic moral principles.

Logical Positivism



Any genuine truth
claim is either
empirical or analytic.

empirical = testable
by sense experience

“It’s snowing outside.”

“The other side of the
moon has mountains.”

“This battery has 1.4 volts.”

analytic = true
by definition

“All bachelors
are single.”

“ $2+2=4$ ”

Logical
Positivism



Any genuine truth
claim is either
empirical or analytic.

Do these make truth claims?

“There’s an invisible angel
sitting on my shoulder.”

“There is a God.”

“Terrorism is wrong.”

Don't confuse these two views:


Emotivism: “X is good” means
 “Hurrah for X!”

Subjectivism: “X is good” means
 “I like X.”

Emotivism is a better view because it's simpler and explains more of the facts.

- It doesn't appeal to mysterious entities.
- It explains why we can't define "good" descriptively, why we can't prove moral beliefs, why people disagree about morality.
- It fits how we speak.

We can't reason
about basic moral
principles.



We can reason about morality if we
assume a shared system of values.
But we can't establish the correctness
of any system of values.

Apply emotivism to



racism



moral
education

Emotivism says:

Moral judgments
aren't truth claims.

They are emotional
exclamations.

“X is good” means
“Hurrah for X!”

But:

The presumption is with
common sense – which
says otherwise.

Moral judgments aren't
necessarily emotional.

Many cases of “good”
and “bad” can't trans-
late into exclamations.

Try replacing “good” and “bad” in these examples with exclamations:

“Hurrah for good people!”

“If lying is bad, then getting your brother to lie is bad.”

“This is neutral (neither good nor bad).”

Logical
Positivism



Any genuine truth
claim is either
empirical or analytic.

Logical Positivism is self-contradictory,
has clear exceptions, and is vague.

“Philosophers who worship science often contradict themselves. They make claims, which can’t be based on science, about science being the only path to the truth. Such philosophers violate our first duty as rational beings, which is not the impossible demand that we prove all our claims, but the humble demand that our claims be consistent with each other.” (Section 5.4)

Emotivism claims to be a better view – because it’s simpler and explains more of the facts.

- Emotivism can’t explain unemotional moral judgments or the use of “good” and “bad” in sentences like “Hurrah for good people!”
- Emotivism *explains away* commonsense ideas of moral truths and moral knowledge.
- Is this a truth claim or an exclamation: “A view is *better* if it’s simpler and explains more”?

Emotivism says we can't reason about basic moral principles.

- If this were true, it would be dreadful; the emotivist model of moral thinking would lead to social chaos and propaganda wars.
- We *can* reason about basic moral principles – as we can see from the views that follow.