APPLICATION OF JUST WAR NORMS TO THE CRISIS WITH IRAQ

Stephen Krupa, S.J. / John Carroll University / Dept. of Religious Studies

Prenotes:

(1) There is no doubt that Saddam Hussein has visited terrible atrocities on his own people, that he has attacked his neighbors and has used his nation’s wealth for his own purposes. International opinion is that he must cease internal oppression in Iraq, end threats to his neighbors, stop support of terrorist organizations, abandon the development of weapons of mass destruction, and destroy all such weapons currently in his possession. The question is how to hold Saddam to these commitments.

(2) Good and intelligent people will differ on the application of just war norms to particular cases.

(3) Roman Catholics need to know that Pope John Paul II has condemned the war saying that he sees no conditions for a just war with Iraq (see America, March 10, 2003, pp. 4-5).

(4) The just war tradition is a developing tradition (for the last 1600 or so years). Global consciousness and the increased awareness of interdependence within the international community might prompt a redefinition and expansion of some of the norms of the just war (e.g. competent authority).

Jus ad bellum

• just cause -- force may be used only to correct a grave evil and to confront a “real and certain danger,” i.e., to defend innocent life, to preserve the conditions necessary to maintain a basically decent human life, and to secure basic human rights where those rights have been violated.

· The Catechism of the Catholic Church limits just cause to cases in which “the damage inflicted by the aggressor on the nation or community of nations [is] lasting, grave and certain”(#2309). It is the opinion of most people and governments in the world that Iraq does not pose an immediate and grave danger to the US.

· The Bush policy of preemptive strike, a preventive use of military action, greatly expands the traditional limit of just cause. The use of preemptive force to deal with presumed threats to national security, or the presumed ill-will of another nation, or to deal with the mere possession of weapons of mass destruction, creates a complicated and dangerous moral precedent. In the current situation with Iraq, however, a “manifest intent to injure” the US and its citizens is ambiguous. (See Michael Walzer’s treatment of the morality of the use of preemptive force in Just and Unjust Wars, 1977).

· In any case, the challenge in the new world order, with threats not necessarily from nation states but from small terrorist groups, will be to change the unacceptable or proscribed behaviors of governments (e.g. the passing of weapons to terrorist organizations), not to extinguish the governments themselves.

· Over 400 weapons inspections at over 300 sites have failed to provide evidence that weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems exists. Even should these weapons exist, there is no evidence that Iraq has clear plans to use these weapons against the US. Again, the evidence for a “manifest intent to injure” is at least ambiguous.

• competent authority -- only someone with responsibility for the public order and the common good (not private individuals or groups) may use force or wage war.

· In view of both our democratic society in the US and an increasingly interdependent world, decisions concerning war ought to (1) comply with the imperatives of the US Constitution that “Congress shall have the power . . . to declare war” (Article I, Sec. 8), (2) reflect the broad opinion of the nation, and (3) involve some form of international sanction. The planned military action against Iraq bypasses these requirements.

• comparative justice -- although there are rights and wrongs on all sides of a conflict, this norm attempts to determine which side is sufficiently “right” in a dispute and whether or not the rights at stake are critical enough to justify the extreme of war. The injustice suffered by one party must sufficiently outweigh that suffered by the other.

· Again, the issue of exactly what injustice the US has suffered or will suffer from Iraq is ambiguous.

• right intention -- (in terms of jus ad bellum) related to “just cause”; force can be used only in a just cause and solely for that purpose.

· See form President Jimmy Carter’s Op-Ed piece in the New York Times, “Just War—or a Just War?” NYT (March 9, 2003). Carter questions the shift in President Bush’s intentions in going to war: from the intention “to eliminate Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction”, which goal (separate from military action to achieve it) has the support of the UN Security Council, the intention is now “to achieve regime change and establish a Pax Americana in the region, perhaps occupying the ethnically divided country for as long as a decade.” For the latter intentions, Carter points out, we do not have the support of international authority.

• last resort -- all peaceful alternatives to war must have been seriously tried and exhausted.

· It is not enough to ask whether a planned military assault to alleviate injustice is “achievable, desirable, and simpler than other alternatives.” One must ask “is it necessary? Is it the only way, the last resort? This must be the test. So far it has not been met” [see Bryan Hehir, “The Hawkish Doctrine of Mr. Bush,” The Tablet 257 (4 January 2003): 4-5].

· It is clear to the members of the UN Security Council, to most of the governments of the world, and to millions of people worldwide that there are alternatives to war with Iraq. Currently, there is international support for inspections leading to disarmament without the use of force. Some argue for more carefully targeted sanctions (U.S. Bishops, Feb. 2003) or the removal of economic sanctions as a first step to peace.

· The Catechism of the Catholic Church states that the use of military force is justified “only when all other means of putting an end [to grave injustice] have been shown to be impractical or ineffective” (#2309). The Bush administration’s lack of confidence in the inspection process is at odds with the record of significant achievement by the IAEA and UNSCOM inspection teams in the 1990s in the discovery and destruction of large quantities of Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons material.

• probability of success -- the irrational use of force may not be employed as when disproportionate measures must be used to achieve success or when the cause is futile.

· The Bush administration has argued that not taking military action at this time will have damaging consequences for the US, indeed for the world. Another view echoing the fears of many, including former US military leaders, is that the use of military force would create the very kind of attacks that it is intended to prevent.

What if Iraq’s response to a preemptive strike by America is to attack Israel? Ariel

Sharon has made it clear that he will respond in kind militarily. Both moderate and

radical Muslim states that are not yet a part of the crisis will be drawn into the battle. The passions of entire region would be enflamed and the hope for peace would disappear.

· Even if the US is successful in war in overthrowing Saddam Hussein, success in reshaping Iraqi culture, society, and politics, is much less likely.

• proportionality -- (in terms of jus ad bellum) that the damage to be inflicted and the costs incurred by war must be proportionate to (i.e., must be outweighed by) the good to be achieved by taking up arms. The use of arms must not produce disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated.

· The planned military response of the Bush administration to Iraq is not proportional to any injury the US has suffered, since the US has not suffered an injury from Iraq. There is no solid proof from any US government agency that Iraq was involved in the terrorist attack of 9/11.

· According to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, the use of force “must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated” (#2309). The potential for new “evils and disorders” after military action in Iraq by the US is great.

· already mentioned is the possibility, even likelihood, of engaging Israel and other currently uninvolved Muslim and Arab nations in an ever widening conflict that could last for years.

· the imagined post-war Iraq would be beset with enormous problems: tribal warfare within Iraq in select regions and also with bordering nations, extensive damage to infrastructure (clean water, sewage systems, hospitals, roads, housing) in an nation that has yet to recover from Gulf War in 1991 and the punishing sanctions of the last twelve years, and the establishment of a stable government.

· The bush policy of striking Iraq without international support reverses the nearly universal respect and friendship extended to the US after the attack of 9/11. More importantly, the nearly unilateral action of the Bush administration reverses the “consistent bipartisan commitments that for more than two centuries have earned our nation greatness” (Carter, ibid.). Moreover, the US refusal to work with and through the UN Security Council renders that institution less effective in the future in dealing with critical events and decisions that will face the international community. This is a potentially dangerous development in a time of global consciousness and an increased awareness of the need for mutual cooperation among nations.

Jus in bello

• discrimination -- (“non-combatant immunity”) attacks on non-combatants and non-military targets are prohibited.

· Thousands of people in Iraq will be killed “(collateral damage”), though not targeted, an important moral difference in classical just war theory (viz. the principle of double effect applied in war is that if an attack is launched and civilian deaths are not intended, even if foreseen, the military action is still permitted). Still, General Tommy Franks, commander of US forces in the Persian Gulf, has expressed concern that a host of military targets in Iraq are near schools, markets, hospitals, mosques, and private homes. “Smart bombs”, Franks, concludes, will not prevent massive deaths.